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Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation: 






  In this paper, we use a vintage-capital model with risk of eviction to assess cocoa 
farmers’ response to changes in their tenure security and to the introduction of a new, 
faster-maturing cocoa variety. The model is calibrated with data from Cameroon in 
calendar year 2000, and then used to simulate the effects of institutional and technical 
change on farmer welfare and deforestation rates. Our findings can be summarized in 
three points. First, improved tenure security over cocoa fields increases farmers’ 
consumption and welfare, but at the expense of more deforestation. Second, the 
introduction of new cocoa varieties with faster maturity and higher input response also 
unambiguously raises farmers’ consumption and welfare. Doing so increases 
deforestation under insecure land tenure, but slows down deforestation under secure land 
tenure. Third, when introducing the two innovations together (more security and also new 
varieties), there is both an increase in welfare and a decline in deforestation. In sum, the 
availability of new cocoa cultivars calls for stronger tenure security, to accelerate 
investment and reduce deforestation. 
 
 
 Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation: 
Cocoa in West Africa 
 
1. Introduction 
  About seventy percent of the world’s cocoa is produced by West African 
smallholders (FAO 2002). The typical production system involves clearing virgin forest 
to plant new trees, and later replacing old cocoa plantations with food crops (Ruf, 1994). 
The future of such cocoa-led deforestation is an urgent question for both 
environmentalists and for the cocoa industry, as West Africa’s forest resources become 
increasingly scarce and valuable. 
  Once planted, cocoa trees can have a productive life of more than 30 years, with 
yields per tree that rise gradually and then fall as the tree grows older. Recent research 
programs have generated new varieties that can grow faster and be more responsive to 
soil fertility and pest control, providing a kind of “green revolution” for tree crops. 
Offering a higher and faster payoff could induce farmers to produce more intensively on 
less land and thus reduce deforestation rates, but might make it even more profitable to 
clear new lands.  
 Technology  influences  deforestation  rates, but so do institutions. Many 
researchers have focused on property rights over the forest. Here we focus on property 
rights over the cocoa fields, which could have a particularly important influence on 
production because the trees are such long-lived , irreversible investments. Faster 
maturity could help make investment less sensitive to expropriation risks, but their higher 
potential payoff might make raise the stakes and increase that sensitivity.  Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation  page 2 
 
  Our central hypothesis is that investment levels and deforestation rates depend on 
the  interaction of technology with institutions: in particular, we ask whether the 
availability of faster-maturing varieties might raise farmers’ incentive to clear virgin 
forests when property rights are weak, but have the opposite effect when the farmer’s 
rights are secure. If so, then the exogenous arrival of the new variety calls for institutional 
change, with higher potential payoffs calling for greater security of tenure. 
  Previous work has focused on either the effects of new cocoa technology (e.g. 
Gotsch and Burger, 2001; Gotsch and Wohlgenant, 2001), or the longstanding problem of 
tenure over trees (e.g. Hill, 1963, Ruf and Zadi, 1998). Our innovation is to examine their 
interaction. We use a dynamic programming model capturing the vintage of trees, with a 
survival function capturing the risk of tenure loss, calibrated with survey data from 
Cameroon. This approach is motivated by the stylized facts described in section two of 
the paper; then section three presents the model, section four describes the data and 
parameters, section five summarizes our results, and section six concludes. 
 
2. Migration, property rights and cocoa farming in West Africa 
  Conflicts over the ownership of cocoa fields often involve disputes between 
migrants who come to plant cocoa, and indigenous forest dwellers with pre-existing land 
use traditions.
1  New cocoa regions have traditionally been developed by migrants, 
largely because of the dramatic increase in labor per hectare associated with the 
conversion from forest to cocoa. Migration and investment leads to new rules for land 
tenure (Chauveau, 2000), often distinguishing between the rights of migrants and those of 
                                                 
1  Other kinds of conflict also arise, of course, even within families. For example, Hill (1963) focuses on 
conflicts in which land is collectively owned but individuals have private rights over the trees. Our model is 
motivated by the migrants’ problem, but can accommodate other kinds of expropriation risk. Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation  page 3 
 
indigenous people. Ruf and Zadi (1998) argued that, in Cote d’Ivoire, the migrant cocoa 
farmers were more concerned for faster and higher returns to their investments than their 
indigenous counterparts, while indigenous farmers’ more secure property rights gave 
them a greater incentive to preserve land quality over time. Our own survey in Cameroon 
(Kazianga and Sanders, 2002) found that cocoa plantations are larger and less shaded in 
high-migration regions, which is likely to lead to more soil erosion and shorter-lived 
trees, as argued by Wood and Lass (1987) and Wilson (1999), who find that zero-shade 
cocoa farms have higher yields in the short run but have shorter lifespans than shaded 
farms. 
  In many contexts, tree planting is used by migrants to assert land ownership. In 
Cameroon, Losch et al (1991) noted that migrants in the frontier region of the Mbam and 
Kim district appeared to be pursuing a land accumulation objective, while indigenous 
farmers were pursuing current income. In Cote d’Ivoire, to encourage both immigrants 
from Sahelian countries and internal migrants to settle the southern forest zone, a 1967 
presidential decree stated that “land belongs to the person who brings it into production, 
provided that exploitation rights have been formally registered” (Koudou and Vlosky, 
1998). But states’ power to implement and enforce formal registrations has been limited, 
and more than 30 years later government officials are still calling for improved land 
tenure in migration regions (Abanda, 1999). Customary tenure rules remain dominant in 
part because of their effectiveness in dealing with inheritance and other frequently-
encountered land transactions (Degrande and Duguma, 2000). Thus expansion of cocoa 
area has proceeded under unclear property rights, and as land becomes scarcer the 
frequency of conflicts has increased (Chauveau, 2000). Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation  page 4 
 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
  Our analytical approach uses a capital accumulation model, augmented to account 
for expropriation risk associated with insecure property rights. The consumption side of 
the model is similar to the standard set-up of dynamic consumption used in various 
applied studies, e.g. Dercon (1998) and Malchow-Moller and Thorsen (2000). The 
production side is a neoclassical investment model with costs of adjustments and vintage 
structure as in Akiyama and Trivedi (1987), extended to allow interaction with other 
activities. The farm household maximizes time additive expected utility over an infinite 
planning horizon, defined over aggregate consumption.  
  Farm output consists of either cocoa or an aggregate of all other goods, that 
includes both food crops and off-farm activity. The cocoa plantation requires long-term 
investment, with 2 to 6 years of gestation followed by a rise and then fall in yield over 
several decades, during which period the farmer may have insecure property rights. The 
aggregate other activity is conducted entirely under a secure property right regime. The 
two activities compete for the farmer’s capital and labor.  
  Based on the literature on perennial crops (e.g. Bellman and Hartley, 1985; 





t a x y y ,                      (1) 
Where y
c
t is total cocoa production in year t, ytv is cocoa production of vintage v in year t, 
which is function of vintage v area (atv), and variable inputs applied on vintage v, (xtv). 
Each year, the area planted in new vintage (at1) is either replanted (rt) or newly cleared 
(nt):  Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation  page 5 
 
t t t n r a + = 1                      (2) 
Once planted, trees remain unless uprooted or killed by disease: 
tv tv v t v t d u a a − − = − + 1 , , 1                                 (3) 
 Where  utv is area in vintage v uprooted in year t, and dtv is area of land occupied 
by the trees that died in year t. Each year, the area replanted in year t is constrained by the 
sum of the area uprooted, and the area of dead trees. For simplicity, we assume that this 
area, if not replanted in the same year, becomes no longer available for cocoa. This 
constraint is written as follows:  
∑ ∑ + ≤
v tv v tv t d u r                                                                        (4) 















t r w n w x w y p − − − = π                                                                        (5) 
 Where 
c
t π  is the profit, 
c
t p  is cocoa price, 
c
t w  is variable input price,  ∑ =
v tv
c
t x x  
is total variable input, 
n
t w is unit costs of new planting including costs of purchasing the 
new forest, and 
r
t w is unit costs of replanting. 
  The aggregate alternative activity, denoted f for food crops, yields immediate 











t l w x l y p − = , π                                                                        (6) 
where 
f
t π  is the profit, 
a
t p  is price level, y is production function defined over labor used 
lat and land 
a
t x , 
a
t w is the labor cost and 
h
at l  is the hired labor in the production process. 
  Property rights over cocoa land are not fully secure. We describe the farmer’s 
continued ownership as a random variable, whose realization is discovered by the farmer Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation  page 6 
 
each year. Hence there are two states of nature; under state s1 the farmer controls his plot 
and under s2 he loses control over the plot. State s2 is irreversible in the sense that lost 




Drawing from the duration literature (Lawless, 1982; Gourieroux and Jasiak, 2001), one 
can define a survivor function, , denoting the probability that the farmer 
keeps control of the plot (i.e. stays under state of nature s1) until at least period t. 
Conversely, (1-S(t)) is the probability that the farmers finds himself in state s2, in year t, 
given that he has been in state s1 previously. The corresponding hazard function of 
eviction is defined as: 
() () () t S t f t h =                        (9) 
where  f(t) is the probability function of land tenure. The hazard function can be 
interpreted as the instantaneous probability of loosing control over a plot, given that it has 
been owned for t periods. Given a risk of expropriation at each period t, and a density 
function f(t) for land tenure, S(t) is derived from (9). Next, the expected utility is defined 
over the two state of nature by using the S(t), so that the farmer problem is:     
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t t x r c 1 − ≤ + π ,                                   under s2                                                        
and (1) to (7), where U is a well-behaved utility function (e.g. twice differentiable, 
strictly concave) defined over aggregate consumption ct, and  is a discount factor. 
Equation (10) represents expected utility defined over the two states of nature s1 and s2 Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation  page 7 
 
(e.g. Gjerde et al, 1999; Kamien and Schwartz, 1971), and in our particular application 









c U , where  ρ  is the relative risk aversion coefficient. 
  With secure property rights, S(t) = 1, for all t, and the objective reduces to the 
first term of 10. Jacoby et al. have used a similar model to evaluate land expropriation 
rate effects on farm investments in China in an econometric framework.  
 
4. Model Parameterization  
  Our parameterization of the model uses survey data from Cameroon. Key 
parameters for cocoa production are tree yields over time, costs and labor requirements 
for establishment and maintenance, plus initial tree stock distribution and the probability 
of expropriation when land tenure is not fully secure. For the aggregate food crop activity 
we need annual labor requirement and yield, and for consumption decisions we need a 
time discount rate and a risk aversion coefficient.  
  Cocoa yields over time for the baseline technology are estimated using 
experiment station data covering 12 years of trials in southern Cameroon. We use spline 
regression with these data to recover tree yield over time (cf. figure 1). The estimated 
parameters are then modified to get the age yield profile of a potential technology (figure 
1), following the assumptions by Gotsch and Burger (2001) who argue that a combination 
of traditional breeding research and biotechnology may lead to a yield increase in the 
order of 30 percent along with more resistance to known pests. The yield profile of the 
new technology reflects the historical focus of cocoa breeding, which has been to develop Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation  page 8 
 
a higher yielding tree with a shorter gestation period. However, the yield decline for such 
trees has been faster than the traditional variety.  
  The establishment costs come from our field survey (table 2), and the labor 
requirements and production costs for cocoa have been constructed using survey data, 
and also data from Whyeth (1994) and Temple (1995). The labor requirements and yield 
for food crops are constructed using a survey conducted by the IITA. The common 
practice in Cameroon is to mix up to five crops (groundnuts, cassava, maize, coco yam, 
and plantain) on a single plot. For tractability, these five crops have been converted into 
an aggregated crop as explained in the appendix.  
 At  t = 0, the area distribution is defined as in table 1 and is chosen for each 
village so that the average yield is replicated by the average yield-age profile. Next, in 
absence of detailed data, we assume that each class age is represented by the average age 
between the two extremes of the interval. In the first class, for example we suppose that 
trees of this class are one year old on average. Throughout the study, an average tree 
density of 1200 per hectare is assumed, and farm size is normalized to one hectare of 
standing cocoa, and one hectare of virgin forest that may or may not be cleared. The 
opportunity cost of clearing that hectare is fixed at FCFA 62500
2 (about US$86), which 
corresponds to the average land cost observed in the frontier region of Cameroon in 2001. 
  On average we assume that the probability of the incumbent farmer losing his plot 
is 0.01. In other words, on average each year one in a hundred plots is lost by the planter 
in a tenure dispute. This magnitude of probability seems consistent with casual accounts 
(e.g. Chauveau 2000, Degrande and Duguma, 2000). Though the probability of being 
expelled at any given period is low, the cumulative effects over time are substantial. 
                                                 
2 The exchange rate adopted is US $ 1= FCFA 730 Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation  page 9 
 
Finally, where risk aversion is considered we use a coefficient of 0.2, and for the discount 
rate we use 10 percent, which is the rate used in previous studies of the cocoa sector in 
Cameroon (e.g. Wyeth, 1994). With an infinitely living agent (as in our model) and such 
a high discount rate, the terminal value of the tree stock has little influence on investment 
choices, so it is not included.   
 
5. Simulation results  
  The aim of the modeling is to assess smallholder response to exogenous shocks in 
technology and tenure regime, over the long run. Our particular interest is in the extent to 
which farmers will replant old trees or clear new lands as the new cocoa varieties become 
available, given alternative property right regimes and the possibility of significant risk 
aversion. To validate the model, we used it to predict the number of replanted trees, the 
vintage composition and the average yield in the two surveyed villages where such 
observations were available, and found that the model adequately simulates both new 
plantings and replanting (validation results are available on request).  
  The main simulation results are summarized in table 3 (with only the existing 
variety) and in table 4 (when the new variety becomes available). The three first columns 
in the tables refer to investments in terms of clearing of new forest and replanting 
existing fields over the planning horizon (i.e. 30 years). The last three columns refer to 
welfare, in terms of discounted aggregate consumption (expressed in FCFA 10,000 and in 
US dollars) or utility level.  
  Results in table 3, representing cocoa planters’ choices when only the old variety 
is available, show that making their land claims fully secure increases their discounted Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation  page 10 
 
consumption from 8.44 to 9.27 million FCFA, or from US$11,565 to $12,708 (a gain of 
almost 10 percent) in the absence of risk aversion, and this result is robust to increasing 
the relative risk aversion coefficient from 0 to 0.2. Increasing tenure security over cleared 
land does, however, raise the rate of deforestation, as farmers slightly increase the rate at 
which they prepare new lands from around 0.92 of the one hectare assumed to be 
available, to 0.97 or 0.99 (depending on their level of risk aversion).  
  The impact of introducing the new tree varieties is shown by comparing table 4 to 
table 3. Consumption and utility levels rise by about 25%, or 2.3 million FCFA (or 
US$3,151) in the absence of risk aversion, and this gain is insensitive to change in 
relative risk aversion from 0 to 0.2. More interestingly, when the tenure regime is fully 
secure, introducing the new variety will cause farmers to reduce their land-clearing rates 
by about 6 percent (from 0.969 to 0.906 of the available hectare without risk aversion, or 
from 0.997 to 0.937 with risk aversion). But when land tenure is insecure, introducing the 
new variety causes precisely the opposite effect, as the earlier maturity makes clearing 
relatively more attractive and farmers clear the entire one hectare available—an increase 
in deforestation of about 8 percent. Introducing both together (increasing security at the 
same time as the new variety arrives) reduces land clearing rates by about 1.5 percent, 
from 0.921 to 0.906 of the available hectare without risk aversion, or from 0.920 to 0.937 
with risk aversion at the 0.2 level. 
  Our finding that the introduction of faster-maturing and higher-yielding varieties 
causes a decrease in deforestation under secure tenure, and an increase in deforestation 
under an insecure regime, is an example of the complex interaction between technology 
and tenure systems discussed by Angelsen and Kaimowitz (2001). In the Cameroon case, Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation  page 11 
 
we find that, if insecurity persists, then introducing the new variety will raise 
deforestation rates, as its earlier payoff makes land clearing relatively more attractive. On 
the other hand, strengthening property rights when the new variety arrives would reduce 
deforestation, by increasing farmers’ incentive to invest in existing lands. This result is 
robust to risk aversion, but does depend crucially on the technological characteristics of 
the innovation.  
 
6. Conclusions 
  This paper uses a vintage-capital model with risk of eviction to assess cocoa 
farmers’ response to changes in their tenure security and to the introduction of a new, 
faster-maturing cocoa variety. The model is calibrated with data from Cameroon in 
calendar year 2000, and then used to simulate the effects of institutional and technical 
change on farmer welfare and deforestation rates.  
  Simulation results can be summarized as follows. First, increasing farmers’ land 
tenure security unambiguously raises their consumption and welfare, by supporting 
higher investment rates. But with traditional cocoa varieties, this increased investment 
takes the form of a relatively high rate of deforestation, since investing in existing 
plantations offers a relatively lower payoff than clearing new forest.  
  Second, introducing new cocoa varieties with faster maturity and higher input 
response also unambiguously raises farmers’ consumption and welfare, by raising the 
payoff to all investment. But doing so under a relatively insecure rights regime further 
raises the deforestation rate. In contrast, doing so under a fully secure regime has the Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation  page 12 
 
opposite effect, reducing the deforestation rate, as the new variety raises the relative 
payoff to further investment on existing plots. 
  Third, when introducing the two innovations together (more security and also new 
varieties), there is a large increase in welfare and, on balance, a decline in deforestation. 
Thus, the benefits from the development of new cocoa cultivars for both farmers and the 
environment (in terms of slowing down deforestation) will be the largest if policies 
leading to more secure tenure over cocoa lands are implemented. Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation  page 13 
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Table 1. Initial area and tree distribution per hectare. 
 
age class  Area  Trees       Age 
0 to 2 years  0.041  49  1 
3 to 5 years  0.059  70  4 
6 to 25 years  0.184  221  16 
26 to 39 years  0.272  326  33 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Property Rights, Production Technology and Deforestation  page 18 
 
Table 3: Summary of results with only old variety 
      Old variety only 
    Investments    Welfare 
    Clearing  Replanting  Rep. Rate    Dis. Cons  Dis. Cons
a  Utility 
R. Risk av.  Tenure               
0.0 Secure 0.969  1.383  0.588   927.67  12707.74  927.67 
0.0 Insecure  0.921  0.957  0.510   844.24  11564.92  844.24 
0.2 Secure 0.997  1.356  0.576   927.65  12707.56  460.45 
0.2 Insecure  0.920  0.947  0.507    844.23  11564.82  427.40 
a: Discounted consumption evaluated in US $ ($ 1= FCFA 730) 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of results when new variety is made available 
      Old and new varieties 
    Investments    Welfare 
    Clearing  Replanting  Rep. Rate     Dis. Cons.  Dis. Cons
a  Utility 
R. Risk Av.  Tenure               
0.0 Secure 0.91  1.08  0.544   1160.98  15903.79  1160.98 
0.0 Insecure  1.00  1.41  0.586   1065.87  14600.97  1065.87 
0.2 Secure 0.94  1.09  0.538   1160.96  15903.55  549.92 
0.2 Insecure  1.00  1.41  0.585    1065.87  14600.96  514.12 
a: Discounted consumption evaluated in US $ ($ 1= FCFA 730) 
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Graphs of selected optimal plan (secure property rights) 
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Note: Replanted trees replace area left vacant due to uprooting and exogenous tree deaths  
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